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An Analysis of Soviet Railway Operation
The Nature of Soviet Railway Operations
USEFULNESS OF STUDY
Of the several forms of transport, the railways alone afford a body
of interrelated data that permit some internal check upon the probable
accuracy of the published figures and also make possible an analysis of
the methods by which the traffic performance is achieved.' Moreover,
at least something is known of the source of many of these data; hence
an impression can be formed of the character of the error which
they may reflect and occasionally some judgment of its magnitude can
be risked. This is of particular importance since the railways account
for by far the greatest part of freight and passenger traffic and it is
around the railways' returns that there has been the greatest con-
troversy in Western countries.
•Distrust has been generated by performance factors, particularly
car turnaround, which may be viewed as impossible by Western
standards. But, in general, the superficial picture is one of a traffic
so large as to be inconsistent with the relatively small railway plant
operated—small in mileage as well as in motive power and equipment.
Characteristically this is interpreted in the West as a sign of weakness,
despite the considerable period over which it has persisted without
significant breakdown of performance. Moreover, the Soviet railroads
have been judged by Western standards and found wanting in effi-
ciency because they employ obsolescent motive power and equipment,
render a service wanting in accommodation to shippers' desires, and
show a low labor productivity. The question may be raised, however,
whether these standards are appropriate to the Soviet scene in the
light of over-all Soviet objectives.Moreover, economic inefficiency
reckoned in Western terms, if it can be shown to exist, casts little
light on (1)the physical capability of Soviet transportation which
should be a prime interest of Western students when appraising the
military capability of the Soviet Union or(2)the adjustment to
patterns of resource availability as they have existed in the Soviet
Union during its progress from a state of economic underdevelopment.
Hence we must embark upon our examination from a somewhat
different point of view.
1 It may also be re-emphasized that they account for from 89 to 90 percentof
Soviet intercity freight traffic as well as for the great bulk of the passenger traffic.
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RELATIONSHIP OF RAILWAY DEVELOPMENT TO THE ECONOMY AT LARGE
A plausible argument can be made for the proposition that the Soviet
railways have gone through three decades of development in which
their course has been charted and held in good correlation with the
over-all Soviet economy. If one postulates a situation in which: (1)
labor is plentiful, but labor with good mechanical skills scarce;(2)
engineering personnel is limited, but more by the quality of its training
and its experience than by number; (3) heavy industry is inadequate
for the demands made on it and there is a marked shortage of capacity
to produce the heavy shapes and forms of steel that railroad develop-
ment requires, and an even more marked shortage of heavy machining
capacity io work to close tolerances; and (4) transport is to be regarded
as a necessary service for industrialization, but is to be used in such a
way as to make the minimum drain on all that is necessary for that
industrialization, not in monetary terms but in physical resources
and available human skills—then much that has occurred in the Soviet
railways finds a ready justification. There are now signs of change
that suggest that the balance of economic forces has altered sufficiently
to make possible movement in directions already pursued in the West.
These signs are to be found particularly in the refinement of steam
motive power, the beginnings of dieselization, the planning of more
extensive electrification of strategic routes, developments in
signaling and in the mechanization of yards. These developments
suggest that concern over the inadequacy of petroleum resources has
diminished, that labor has become less plentiful, and that the level
of mechanical and engineering skills has improved. Of what, then,
did this adjustment to Soviet conditions consist?
It has been said that the Soviet railways in recent years bear a
marked resemblance to the North American railways of the early
1920's. There is an element of truth in this statement, but it cannot
be accepted without qualification.Like American railways in the
period before highway and air competition, the Soviet system is
established upon the basis of moving tonnage in slow freight service,
but there is even less differentiation in Soviet freight service than on
the American railways of earlier times, for interrailroad competition
is absent and, beyond what is necessary to the security of perishables,
little concession has been made toward provision of fast freight services.
To maximize line capacity, the objective is to operate a railroad at
as nearly a constant speed as possible.
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Any transportation system may be analyzed in its adjustment to
the needs of the shipper in terms of three primary dimensions: the
rates charged for specific services; the over-all speed between points;
and the service amenities, which include frequency, reliability, size
of shipment permitted, special parcels facilities, split pick-ups and
deliveries, expediting, diversion and reconsignment privileges, and the
privilege of holding for billing and other matters.2 As already noted,
the Soviet rate system is used as a tool to accomplish certain objectives.
But relative to other prices, Soviet freight charges as measured by
average revenues appear to surmount efficiently the barriers of distance
in terms of cost. At the distances within range of average hauls, cost
of transportation appears reasonably related to other costs. In average
speed of movement the Soviet system also shows up well. While train
speeds between initial and final terminals, including all delays on the
road, do not compare favorably with present speeds in the United
States, they are offset by faster movement through yards so that Soviet
over-all times correspond well with those for similar hauls in the
United States. Under the head of service amenities, however, virtually
nothing is provided except, over most main routes, a high frequency
of freight train service which arises naturally from the high density
and concentration of the freight traffic and the relatively light net
train load. By ignoring amenities that are forced upon carriers in
a competitive system, Soviet railroads simplify their task considerably.
And they go even further in this respect than the railroads of other
Countries in an earlier era, for they provide virtually no accommoda-
tion for the less-than-carload consignment and for peddler services,3
thus forcing concentration into carload consignments and avoiding
the waste of cars inherent in lightly loaded less-than-carload business.4
In the production of mass slow-speed freight transportation, the
Soviet roads have worked with simple but rugged plant and have
carried standardization to an extreme degree. For over twenty years
three standard types of steam freight locomotive have represented
virtually all the additions and replacements in the freight locomotive
fleet, while two types of steam passenger power have sufficed for most
needs, and special designs for switching work have not been required.
2 Sovietsystem escapes some of the complexity of a competitive system for,
where it is necessary to hold a bank of cars at a port, segregation by large numbers
of individual owners as well as by grade is generally not required.
8Peddlerservices consist of the delivery of less-than-carload consignments at
intermediate stations from cars moving in local freight trains.
4Thesmall two-axle caris,.of course, very handy for smaller consignments
within the range of its capacity.Some recent emphasis upon the necessity of
improved service for small consignments appears to have been dissipated.
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Major parts are interchangeable between the heavy freight and the
heavy passenger power. Freight car types are distinctly limited in
number and new construction has been consistently restricted to a
very small number of standard designs. The variety to be found in
the whole system is rather less than any individual large American
railway would boast of, particularly in dimensions and door arrange-
ments of box cars and dimensions and special equipment of gondolas.
The specialized car finds no favor on the Soviet roads and is provided
only as necessity dictates, e.g., in tank cars and refrigerator cars.
Standard all-purpose cars are made do where shippers in a competitive
economy would require better adjustment to their needs and would
secure it. The standard open gondola serves not only bulk loadings
but also much traffic which in the West would be loaded in covered
cars. This lack of specialized cars is very helpful in keeping empty
car-mileage at a low figure.
Soviet locomotive practice, as much as anything else, illustrates
the adjustment of railroad equipment to the general economic position
of the country. The freight power is generally of the 2-10-0 and 2-10-2
types, small wheeled, small boilered, worked at low pressure, and of
simple and rugged design.5 Such power with bolted bar frames and
cylinders and saddle separately cast imposes minimum demands on
manufacturing facilities and requires limited skills of a good part of
the mechanical department force,6 while the relatively small size of
power and its high degree of standardization hold down the machinery
and stock requirements of running sheds and back shops for mainte-
nance and repair. Power is intensively used and mileage between heavy
repairs is not good, which may reflect both the quality of materials
used and the character of the work performed. But the entire problem
of supplying and maintaining power with limited skilled forces on
which to draw is vastly simplified by such a standardization over long
periods on power which the West regards as obsolete7 because of high
5Dimensionsof all principal types in general use are given in Henry Sampson
(ed.), World Railways, London, 1952, f.c. 124.See also P. E. Garbutt, The Russian
Railways, London, 1949, p. 50.
6Suchframes are bolted together from relatively small rolled bars, while each
cylinder may be a separate iron casting and the saddle, cast in one or two pieces.
holds the cylinders together and ties them to the frames and the front end of the
boiler. By contrast, U.S. practice in the last twenty years of steam locomotive pro-
duction puts the whole assembly into a single massive steel casting sometimes weigh-
ing over a hundred tons.
7Between1938 and 1948 kilometrage between classified repairs for freight power
increased from 32,381 to 43,500, while for passenger power it increased from 47,336
to 59,700. The average heavy repair in 1946 required 33.3 days while the average
medium repair required 29 days.Heavy classified repairs were shown to include
tires, bearings, machinery, cylinders, boiler, and firebox.
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fuel consumption, small capacity, inadequate boiler horsepower for
sustained high speeds at full tonnage rating, and heavy maintenance
Cost.8 Such power is generally hand fired and the common road crew is
composed of three men (or women) .9
While the standard types have been retained, considerable modern-
ization has been accomplished without introducing undue complexity
or a very high level of technology. Greater speed, without damage to
track, on power having fifty-two-inch and fifty-nine-inch wheels has
required the reduction of dynamic augment, which has been accom-
plished through the introduction of several patterns of disc wheel
centers resembling designs used earlier in the United States, while
some effort appears to have been expended to lighten rods and valve
gear assembly.'° Coal and water stops have been reduced by the
gradual use of larger tenders as well as of condensing tenders in desert
country and in areas with bad water. Boiler performance has been
improved through the introduction of superheater units.comparable to
the Elesco Type E and of thennic siphons and exhaust steam injectors
on some of the more recent power. Compounding has generally been
avoided, while liberal clearances have enabled cylinders and motion
work to be kept outside the frames, thus avoiding the maintenance
complexities associated with three- and four-cylinder power. No form
of articulated11 power has been in service on more than an experi-
mental basis. Double heading has been preferred to the complexities
of large power, although the very flexible Beyer-Garrett has been tried
and presumably performed according to its accustomed high standards
without, however, commending itself for adoption under the condi-
tions imposed by the Soviet system of maintenance. It is interesting
to note that articulation is featured in two recent designs of large
steam power, presumably experimental. The articulation is as used
in Mallet engines, but the locomotives are not compounded.'2
S This last is largely a reflection of manpower inputs.
9 By contrast, Soviet freight trains carry no cabooses and a single conductor makes
up the rest of the crew.
10 1915, U.S. freight power generally had wheels of sixty-three-inch diameter
or larger.
11 An articulated locomotive is one that employs one or more steam engines
coupled to driving wheel sets which are connected to the main frames by pins and
are thus permitted to move laterally on curves.
12 These types show a strong resemblance to U.S. types developed in the late 1930's
and built in some number immediately before and during the second war. They
are of 2-6-6-2 and 2-8-8-4 wheel arrangements.In view of the shift to diesel now
under way, they will presumably not be duplicated.
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In the last few years progress has been made in shifting to diesel
power in desert country and on some lines of difficult profile,'3 and
much more electrification and dieselization is planned under the
present seven year plan, so that diesel and electric power will replace
steam over the greater part of the system.14 Whereas a desire to avoid
dependence on petroleum fuel has been argued in the past as standing
in the way of dieselization, it appears probable that the creation of
an adequate maintenance force of the higher and more varied skills
required has also stood in the way and is only now being overcome.15
The advantages of diesel power on lines which permit only a light
axle loading and yet have relatively heavy grades are especially great
and the adoption of such power may avert the necessity to electrify
certain routes where the traffic density appears hardly adequate to
support the overhead installations necessary forelectrification.16
On such routes dieselization may produce virtually the same increase
in line capacity that could be secured from electrification and it will
tend to be done under Soviet conditions less for reasons of operating
economy than for increasing the capacity of the line without the neces-
sity of laying. additional running track. Nevertheless Soviet analysts
place a good deal of emphasis on the prospect of economy and their
estimates closely resemble those made in the United States to support
the shift to diesel power.17
Soviet planning and accomplishment in railway line have shown
similar characteristics.Nowhere isthere an attempt to promote
economic growth through the prior provision of transportation. The
idea that settlement and development will follow the construction of
a transport system is, as far as possible, reversed. Railroads are looked
upon as devices to secure particular objects; hence, whereas the light
density of line within Soviet territory as it emerged from the revolution
might have suggested a vast expansion to open out new territory,
13 Profile refers to the combination of gradients over a line of railroad.
14 The proportion of road freight service worked in steam declined from 89.8
per cent in 1954 to 66.5 per cent in 1959.
15 The strictures on petroleum fuel appear to have been considerably relieved.
An extensive training program to improve the skills of the mechanical force has
been required.
16 Available illustrations and the report of the recent railway mission both in-
dicate, however, that a lighter catenary is used than is acceptable in U.S. practice.
Hence the investment requirements per mile of electrified track are presumably lower
and the break-even density correspondingly lower.(See Railway Age, August 1960,
p. 14.)
17 These analyses have been explored by James H. Blackman and are discussed
at some length in his Transport Development and Locomotive Technology in the
Soviet Union, Columbia, S. C., 1957.
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nothing of the sort has occurred. Projects have received careful scrutiny
in the light of proposed mineral exploitation, industrial construction,
and agricultural development. Maximum use has been made of avail-
able waterways in territory not yet penetrated by railroads. Roads and
even air transport serve where the volume in immediate prospect does
not justify the heavy investment of metals required for minimum
standard railroad construction. And this is as would be expected in
opening up new territory where the modern variety of means of
transport is available, although the calculations employed elsewhere
would differ in detail, particularly as to what corresponds to the rate
of interest.
The railroad system of Russia, though in considerable part privately
developed under the tzars, was never a competitive system.It was
planned to meet the more urgent requirements as evaluated by the
government in a nonduplicative system and the private portion was
developed under a system of concessions somewhat similar to that in
France. An integrated network of thin coverage, relatively bereft of
feeders except in the mineral districts, resulted. Before the first war
roughly two-thirds of the system was owned and. operated by the
government, and Splawn reports an apparent tendency toward private
ownership subsidized and supervised by the government.18 Notwith-
standing the planned character of the system and its lack of duplicative
and competitive trackage, its freight traffic density had not quite
developed by 1913 to the density of the U.S. network.19
The Soviet pattern of development has been wholly intensive, not
extensive. Primary attention was placed upon strengthening the more
important select main lines of the existing system with a view to con-
centrating the heavy traffic flows on them. Such routes were given
additional second main track, passing sidings, and signal facilities,
and were laid with heavier rail on improved roadway; in some in-
stances, grades and curvature on them were ameliorated. Important
yard expansion was necessary to permit these lines to operate at some-
thing approaching a constant twenty-four-hour tempo, for the presence
of traffic that was pressing upon facilities and could be moved without
taking account of commercial conditions enabled these lines to handle
several times the train density that might congest a similar line in
another country, provided the yards were made adequate. The absence
18W.M.W. Splawn, Government Ownership and Operation of Railroads, New
York, 1928, p. 109.
19TheRussian system carried 940,000 net ton-miles per mile of road compared
with 1190,000 net ton-miles per mile of road in the U.S.
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of fast passenger trains was important since it greatly reduced the
passes required. Heavier power, four-axle freight car equipment, and
cars equipped with air brakes or with air lines were also concentrated
on such line segments to permit heavy train loads relative to the
system average.20
Wherever possible, improvement of existing lines with a minimum of
new construction was relied upon to accommodate new and growing
industrial areas.Certain cut-offs were constructed to eliminate cir-
cuitous movement of important volumes of freight. Other line develop-
ments were keyed to economic developments that could be anticipated
to produce such volumes of freight traffic as to necessitate railroad
connections. Most segments of the existing system became more useful
as commodity exchange relationships developed and industrialization
progressed. Hence there was a general increase of density, but with
a remarkable concentration over the routes planned and developed
for heavy traffic movement. As long as congestion of junctions, yards,
and terminals is avoided, the favorable effect of this concentration on
the efficiency of car movement and car distribution is marked. In
appraising results, it must be constantly remembered that between
all points there is no competitive routing whatever; that the traffic
is normally concentrated over the best-developed direct route; that
the volume is sufficient with such concentration of routing to permit
early preblocking of trains and often the assembling of trains which
can move considerable distances without reclassification(i.e., main
trackers); that a shipper's traffic between two points is never dis-
tributed over a number of competing routes but instead may be
assembled over a period of days, although not loaded into cars, for
a multiple-car movement; and that as freight cars comprise a single
20Theperformance of the Soviet system from the re-establishment of the prewar
level in 1926 through 1935 when the "transportation crisis" was under way is
reminiscent of the Pennsylvania Railroad east of Pittsburgh and Erie during its
intensive development from 1900 to 1907, but represents a greater intensification of
freight working. The Pennsylvania at the start of the period was, however, probably
the most highly developed railroad in the world at the time. The data are:
Soviet System Pennsylvania
Increase in first main track 13.5% 6.8%
Increase in ton-miles 275.0% 81.0%
In 1900 when the Pennsylvania's intensive development was about to get under
way, its freight density per mile of line was slightly over 3,200,000 net ton-miles per
annum, or more than the Soviet density of 1935.When 1907 brought a break
in business, the road was equipped to handle higher traffic levels than were actually
achieved so far as main trackage and yards were concerned.Pennsylvania's heaviest
and standard freight power then was class H-6sb with a tractive effort of 42,500
pounds, some 20 per cent lighter than the standard Soviet power of the thirties.
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pooi and represent only a slight diversity of types, empties can be
distributed without regard to diverse ownerships and types over the
most direct routes, thus holding empty car mileage to a minimum.2 1
Unhappily the poor mechanical condition of equipment and inade-
quate inspection at initial terminal too frequently result in the
breaking up of maintrackers through the loss of bad-order cars and
a filling out of tonnage with other classifications at intermediate points.
Although administrative complexities and deficiencies detract from
these advantages, their influence on the operating results must be
judged to be very substantial. The key role of yards and terminals
in a scheme designed to secure such intensive employment of main
trackage explains the vast amount of interest in recent Soviet literature
in yard layout and design, yard equipment, and efficient yard opera-
tions, and explains also the extensive yard improvement throughout
nearly the whole Soviet period.
To economize material, axle loads and speeds have been kept within
limits that permit the use of relatively light rail section without an
excessive rate of wear, and, as Hunter has pointed out, trains of
relatively light weight and moderate speed have been run more
frequently.22 Russian motive power generally does not exceed an axle
load of twenty-one tons, the type LK being an exception that is
employed in small numbers and only on a limited route mileage.
By contrast, heavy American steam freight types generally exceeded
thirty-ton axle loading and, in some of the heaviest, exceeded thirty-
seven tons.23 The operation of such heavy power at high speeds,
even with large-diameter wheels and good counterbalance, caused
severe rail wear and promoted rapid fissure growth even in 132-pound
rail section.24
Light axle loads and the absence of articulation of course result
in locomotives of somewhat limited tractive effort, the heaviest Soviet
steam freight power in general use developing 64,790 pounds of
21 The common use of open-top cars, particularly low-sided gondolas, for com-
modities which would be loaded in box cars in this country. permits the develop-
ment of return loads. Planned interchange of bulk commodities commonly loaded in
open tops also sometimes facilitates the avoidance of empty car-mileage.
22 Holland Hunter, "How the Russians Run Railroads," Railway Age, August 80,
1954, pp. 24 if.
23 In the Pennsylvania Railroad class Q-2, just over thirty-nine tons.
24 Soviet rail section on Class I lines is generally 915 pounds, the interim standard
adopted in 1935, but rail up to 181 pounds has been laid.The average main-line
track is of less substantial construction and the characteristic slow-speed operation
with light power permits low standards for line and surface, hence characteristically
rough track. The want of adequate ballasting and drainage, however, necessitates
high labor inputs even to maintain these low standards.
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tractive effort compared with 72,000 to 156,000 pounds for heavy
American steam freight power. The bulk of Soviet freight traffic is
handled by power of approximately 53,000 pounds of tractive effort.
But where labor is plentiful and train speeds low, the operation of
frequent light trains can expedite car movement without noticeable
disadvantage up to the point of line congestion. And it must be borne
in mind that, apart from track, the greatest investment of steel in the
railroad plant is in its car stock so that a saving of cars through faster
handling is of particular resource significance. Although the Soviet
Union relies heavily upon composite construction in gondola and
closed cars, thus avoiding a heavy requirement of plate by substituting
wood sheathing, the principal weight of steel is in car trucks and
underframe and cannot be dispensed with.25It is from this heavy
steel requirement and the accompanying necessity to expand heavy
casting, rolling, and forging facilities that the extreme pressures to
economize the use of freight cars apparently derive. As will appear,
the Soviet railroads and the ministry have deceived themselves and
the public, for their active fleet of freight cars is not as small as
represented by their data and in consequence the car turnaround is
not as fast as reported. In addition, there are important exclusions
from the active fleet.Nevertheless performance measured by this
datum is excellent when judged by Western standards of experience.
Soviet Use of Plant and Equipment
INTENSIVE UTILIZATION
There are four principal categories of plant and equipment employed
together in a railroad operation: permanent way, yards and terminals,
motive power, and cars. To these must be added the facilities necessary
for inspection, servicing, and running repair.Soviet practice is gen-
erally designed to make intensive use of all elements of plant and equip-
ment and has been under continual pressure to handle burgeoning
traffic and to hold investment to a minimum. To meet effectively the
requirements made of it by the traffic, any railroad operation must
achieve a balance among the elements of plant and equipment, but
that balance may differ from one railroad to another depending upon
the needs of the service. At any time the proportions of the plant
relative to the traffic load may bring alterations in the manner of
its working.
25 Car trucks fabricated out of bars continue in use, however, although completely
replaced with cast steel side frames in the United States.
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The available Soviet operating statistics are less complete than those
of. the United States, although they include some items which are
unknown here, but they do comprise data from which important
operating averages can be computed and they enable a general im-
pression of the operation to be secured. For our purpose, which is
to confirm the possibility of achieving the recorded traffic performance
with the available plant and thus gain assurance of the usefulness
of the traffic data as an indication of economic growth, they are
reasonably adequate.Nonetheless, it will be necessary to resort to
speculation in reviewing these data in order to judge their meaning.
And, as noted in Chapter 2, great caution should be observed with
the operating statistics given in Appendix A on which we shall have
to rely. A variety of methods has been employed in calculating
certain approximations in the basic series on varying but often scant
evidence and on occasion interpolation has been resorted to in order
to chart what appears to have been the probable course of events.
Always it should be borne in mind that the quality of service rendered
by the Soviet railways differs substantially from that in Western
countries and when comparisons are made with U.S. performance
it should be noted that our railroads perform a substantial storage
function and certain marketing service functions that are not regarded
as within the realm of transport in the Soviet Union.
PERMANENT WAY
The relatively high freight traffic density per mile of line recorded
in the late 1930's for the Soviet system aroused some skepticism.26
What, then, must be said of a density which appears to have stood in
1954 at 59 per cent above the prewar peak of 1939? If comparison is
made with average freight densities in other parts of the world, the
Soviet performance appears improbable; but itis characteristic of
most Western systems, and of the U.S. railways in particular, that
they have much greater mileage of a character that seldom exists in
the Soviet system and that, where they have been developed on a
competitive plan as in North America or Great Britain, there is
much duplication of main lines and considerable overbuilding. Nor
has any large railroad system elsewhere so nearly made maximum use
26 It is to be recalled, however, that, as pointed out in Chapter 2, Soviet tonnage
originated is most certainly overstated and, as appears in Chapter 3, the overstate-
ment is probably greatest for some of the long-haul commodities moving in closed
cars.This may produce a greater overstatement of ton-kilometers than of tonnage.
In any event traffic density when measured in ton-kilometers per kilometer of line
is overstated in consequence.
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of main-line trackage by not operating exceptionally high-speed trains
and by avoiding the bunching of trains at particular hours according
to the needs of traffic and in disregard of the commercial convenience
that carries much weight in a competitive system. As Sir William
Acworth puts it, "no one needs to be told that the running of trains
at varying rates of speed diminishes enormously the carrying capacity
of a line."27 Nor need one doubt that extensive multiple tracking
and improvement of signaling have been forced in the United States,
not by the amount of traffic to be dealt with in twenty-four hours,
but by the bunching of a good part of the day's traffic over certain
sections of the line in a limited span of hours. This happened because
of the necessity to schedule arrivals and departures of freight as well
as passenger trains to meet the public convenience under pain of
losing the business to a more accommodating competitor.
Operating statistics on a uniform and comprehensive basis began
to be compiled for the U.S. railways during the first war under the
aegis of the U.S. Railroad Administration. Reverting to the returns
of 1923, when the postwar depression and the shopmen's strike had
been overcome, we may indulge in a few comparisons with a period
when the American lines operated almost wholly on steam power28
(much of which was roughly comparable in tractive effort to the heavi-
est of Soviet motive power) at roughly comparable freight train speeds
and without the especially fast long-distance freight and passenger
trains of more recent years.29 In November of 1923 the average density
(net ton-miles per mile of road per day) for large steam railroads
(excluding the Long Island) ranged from 2,289 for the Denver and
Rio Grande Western to 30,872 for the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie.30
If the November density were multiplied by twelve, bearing in mind
the tendency for growth to obscure seasonal variance in the Soviet
case, and employing November in preference to the October peak
month, we would obtain the following comparisons:
Net Ton-Kilometers per Kilometer Net Ton-Miles per Mile
of Line per Year of Line per Year
Soviet system 1939 4,570,000Pennsylvania RR 4.659,955
1954 7,134,000Pittsburgh and Lake Erie RR 11,268,280
1958 10,672,000Erie Railroad 5,322,065
27 William Acworth, The Railways of England, London, 1899, P. 399.
28 A small electrified freight service existed on the New Haven, Norfolk and
Western, Virginian, and Milwaukee.Diesel power was as yet unknown.
29 It should not be supposed that even in 1923 the quality of American pas-
senger trains in speed was as poor as that of the Soviet system today.
30 The respective October figures were 2,613 and 36,419.(Interstate Commerce
Commission, Operating Statistics of Large Steam Railroads, October and November
1923.)
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In November 1923, 20,538 miles (roughly one-seventh) of the United
States system had densities exceeding those of the Soviet system in 1939,
but no large railroad had exceeded the density which the Soviet system
achieved by 1954, since the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie was a property
operating only 231 miles of road, almost all of which was mutiple-
track line.
Our knowledge of the mileage of second and additional main track
for the Soviet Union does not extend beyond the late 1930's, except
for a few benchmark years. That there has been a good bit of multiple
tracking since the war may be inferred from the intensive growth of
other elements of plant, and the references to such work in the
literature. However, it is impossible to put it into quantitative terms
although the 1950 Plan, if realized, would have resulted in about 30
per cent of the system being double tracked. The closeness of the
Soviet and Pennsylvania Railroad freight densities shown above sug-
gests a comparison of the trackage position of the two for the respective
years.31 The Pennsylvania System in 1923 had a second main track
over approximately one-third of its length, a third track on approx-
imately 8 per cent of its road mileage, and a fourth track on about
6 per cent of the road.32 In 1938 the Soviet system had a second track
over 30 per cent of its road mileage, but we have no definite informa-
tion about third and additional main running track.33 Portions of
the double track on the Pennsylvania could be accounted as necessary
only because of bunched fast passenger schedules and the same was
true of portions of its third and fourth track mileage. The position
as to main running track was, therefore, roughly comparable. The
range of densities on the Pennsylvania main trackage appears, however,
to have been much wider than that of the Soviet system, for it had
secondary lines of very light traffic as well as densities upon the New
York, Philadelphia, Middle, and Pittsburgh Division main lines which
never were approached by any portion of the Soviet railroad system.
The year 1952 gives the highest traffic performance of recent years
for many of our large railroad systems. In November of that year the
traffic density, converted to an annual rate, for 8,723 miles of line in
the United States embracing seven separate reporting railroad systems,
exceeded the density of the Soviet system. These densities ranged up
to 12,960,785 net ton-miles for the Bessemer and Lake Erie, slightly
81 It should be borne in mind that the passenger traffic density of the Pennsyl-
vania System wasin1923 about one-half that of the Soviet system in 1939.
32 From the Record of Transportation Lines as quoted in Poor's, Railroad Section.
83 Holland Hunter, Soviet Transportation Policy, Cambridge. Mass., 1957, p. 371.
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more than one-half of which was double tracked. On 12,072 additional
miles of line the U.S. densities exceeded 6 million ton-miles, hence
closely approached the Soviet average. It is of particular interest that
the New York, Chicago, and St. Louis Railway Co. (almost entirely
single track)achieved a hypothetical84 density of approximately
6 million net ton-miles per mile of road. Other high-density roads
which were almost entirely single-track systems were:35
Southern Pacific8,065 miles of line net ton-miles per mile of road
Western Pacific1,190 miles of line3,978,500 net ton-miles per mile of road
Track capacity, of course, is more nearly related to the number of train
movements per twenty-four hours than to the ton-mileage put over it.
The Soviet system has traditionally run frequent comparatively light
freight trains, although average freight trainloads have shown a fairly
continual increase.Over the average kilometer of main line, the
Soviet system put 6,534 freight train-kilometers in 1939.36 At the
November rate, the Pennsylvania system operated 5,306 freight train-
miles per mile of road in 1923. The year 1958 is the last for which we
have Soviet data, partly estimated, covering road mileage, average
locomotive-kilometers per locomotive day and average number of
freight locomotives in service. These data give 9,510 freight train-
kilometers per kilometer of road. By comparison, the Cincinnati,
New Orleans, and Texas Pacific (roughly two-thirds double track and
the remainder single) operated 7,536 freight train-miles per mile of
road in 1952, the single-track New York, Chicago, and St. Louis
operated 4,164, and the Pennsylvania System as a whole operated
On the Middle Division the Pennsylvania, during heavy
traffic months, has often in the prediesel period exceeded the rate of
28,000 freight train-miles per mile of road per annum handled
primarily on the two freight tracks, as the passenger mains were
required to accommodate upward of sixty passenger trains per day.
A similar rate has been achieved on the double-track line between
Wago and Columbia, while over the heavy grades via Gallitzin Summit
the movement has often exceeded 100 freight trains per day, for the
most part accommodated on the two freight running tracks,38 despite
84Thatis, twelve tithes the November figure.
35Densitiesfrom Operating Statistics of Large Steam Railroads, Interstate Corn-
merce Commission, November 1952. Track mileage from Sixty-sixth Annual Retort
on the Statistics of Railways in the United States, Interstate Commerce Commis-
1952.
86Computedfrom series C-22 and C-34 in Appendix C.
37Statisticsof Railways in the United States, Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, 1952.
88SeePennsylvania Railroad Company, Traffic Density Charts by Divisions.
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the necessity for return of large numbers of light engines in helper
service. There appears to be no reason to question the practicability,
in the light of our experience, of the ton-kilometer or freight train
densities reported in the Soviet statistics. The performance is clearly
possible upon a road mileage with the proportion of second track
indicated under the operating conditions which prevail in the Soviet
Union.39
YARD AND TERMINAL FACILITIES
No large body of information on Soviet yard and terminal practice
has come to our attention, nor has a special effort been made to study
this phase of Soviet railroad operations. It is, however, apparent that
considerable emphasis has been placed on yard improvements, the
analysis of yard operations, and the training of yard and terminal
personnel. A considerable analytical and instructionalliterature,
which has no recent parallel in the English language, has appeared
but is generally devoid of data on actual yard performance. Large
retarder-equipped yards appear to be increasing in number at strategic
points where it is possible to concentrate car classification, and added
emphasis has been accorded this phase of plant improvement since
the war.
On January 1, 1946, there were reported to be 896 division and
classification yards on the Soviet rail system, giving an average spacing
not exceeding 125.97 kilometers.40 Since Soviet road freight power is
customarily assigned to an engine house and operates out and back
with an assigned crew, division points tend to be placed at convenient
points for an engine turn. Such divisional yards, in many instances,
appear to perform little more work than change of engines and crews,
inspection, cutting out of bad-order cars, and adjustment of tonnage.
At major classification yards, considerable trafficisoften relayed
through without the trains being worked, although the cars included
in such trains are reported in the count of cars handled. Cars are
shown, on the average, to have been detained 6.5 hours in 1940 and
8.0 hours in 1945 in each yard along the route and the total number
of such detentions encountered at yards transited in each full car
turnaround was 10.7 in 1940 (one each 96.4 kilometers) and 13.2 in
Bolt must also be recalled that, as Khachaturov points out, the bulk of the Soviet
system is of easy profile and with moderate curvature (see S. S. Baizak, et at., Eco-
nomic Geography of the USSR, New York, 1949, p. 449).
40D. P. Zagliadimov, etat.,Organizatsiia dvizheniia na zheleznodorozhnorn
transporte [Organization of Movement of Railroad Transportation], Moscow, 1947,
p. 384. When allowance is made for duplication at junctions, the average spacing
is somewhat shorter.
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1945 (one each 99.7 kilometers) •41 Detention at major intermediate
yards has been steadily reduced as an element in the turnaround of
the average car, having declined from 73.7 hours per turnaround in
1950 to 50.0 hours in 1958.42 The relatively modest detention, by
comparison with averages experienced in representative major U.S.
yards, would appear to reflect in part the frequent movement in small
trainload lots and the absence of extensive branch line and local
service and in part the extent of forwarding in full train lots and
effective prior classification.
Much has been made in the Soviet literature of the practice of
forwarding in solid trainloads from origin points to final destination
and continuing emphasis is given to the potential importance of this
practice in improving the efficiency of railroad operations. Yet defini-
tive information is conspicuous by its absence.It has been asserted
that from 40 to 70 per cent of the total tons originated moves in full
trainload lots, but such a statement provides wide margin for specula-
tion.43 Moreover, it is confirmed only to a limited extent by some
other data, notably those on the percentages of coal cars switched at
yards in the Donets Basin traffic where one would expect to find
opportunities for the forwarding of traffic in solid trains. Traffic plan-
fling on a monthly basis does provide for the accumulation of quantities
to be shipped between particular installations in order to offer the
traffic in multiplecar lots and it provides for the exchange of orders
among suppliers to the same end.Certain customary solid train
movements are known to exist in the coal, ore, petroleum, and timber
trades. As the trainload is smaller and less variable than in U.S.
practice and as an effort, lacking in the Western countries, is made to
encourage multiple-car movements, it may be concluded that the
practice has its effect upon the volume of yard work which must be
performed.44
Effective prior classification, as distinct from movement in full trains,
probably has a greater influence in holding down the volume of
switching at intermediate points. The control of traffic by the railroads,
the absence of diversity of routing, and the simplicity of the network
4lIbid., p.384.
42L.S. Iakubov, Osnovy zheleznodorozhnoi statistiki[Principles of Railroad
Statistics], 2nd ed., Moscow, 1959.
43Tretiakov,et a!., Ocherki razvitiia zheleznodorozhnoi nauki I tekhniki [Essays
on the Development of Railroad Science and Technology], Moscow, 1953, p. 236.
44Asalready noted, however, laudable efforts at origin terminals appear fre-
quently to be frustrated by poor mechanical condition of equipment, inadequate
maintenance, and indifferent inspection and servicing.
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all contribute to the feasibility of putting cars at or near initial
terminals into trains which may be handled without intermediate
switching to or near final destination.45 The only comprehensive and
detailed study of car movement on the railways of the United States
was made in 1933. A comparison with 1940 Soviet data on yard and
t€rminal delay is shown in Table 17, but it should be noted that the
U.S. data, derived from terminated waybills, refer to loaded cars only,
while the Soviet data include complete turnaround from one loading
to the next. The average Soviet car was yarded less frequently in
TABLE 17
COMPARISONOFELEMENTS OF TURNAROUND: UNrw STATES, 1933, AND
SovIET UNiON, 1940
United Statesi Soviet Union2
Average haul (miles) 353 823
Miles between yardings 46.7 76.9
Detention at yards andterminals(hours) 69.6
Average detention per yard or terminal (hours) 7.3 6.5
SouItcE: Col. 1: Freight Traffic Report, 1935, Vol. II, pp. 264 if; col. 2: Zagliadimov,
Organizatsiia dvizheniia, p. 384.
comparison with the mileage made. In the light of the different con-
ditions encountered by the Soviet railroads, the difference in average
detention does not appear to have been significant. But the effect of
fewer yardings in a unified and noncompetitive system is to hold down
total detention per car turnaround.46
In fixing norms and in pressing for their fulfillment, the. Soviet
administration emphasizes both an increase in the average trainload
and a decrease in the average detention at yards and terminals.If
other conditions remain the same, these are opposed objectives and
tend to obstruct one another. Unless the volume of traffic for each
destination separated in the classification yard increases proportionally
with the increase in average net trainload, the improved train loading
will be achieved at the cost of increased car detentionIf density of
45 On the inefficiencies which may thus be reduced, see John R. Turney, "The
Price of Open Gateways," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, September 1936, p. 22.
46 It should be noted that evidence appears from time to time that reported
average detention is minimized by inflating the car count.It is not known how
widespread this practice is, but the incentives for such manipulation are considerable
in the effort of yard supervisors to meet their norms.In the United States the
methods of determining car count are not always uniform from 'yard to yard even on
the same railroad, but reliance is most commonly placed upon cars dispatched as a
method for measuring performance.
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traffic, profile, and characteristics, of motive power are kept in mind,
it would appear that efforts to minimize yard detention have out-
weighed efforts to improve trainload. However, the immediate postwar
increase in average detention may in part reflect improved train 'load-
ing, although it is much more likely to reflect less' effective multiple-car
consignments, less complete prior blocking of trains, some degree of
general disorganization of traffic movement, and less satisfactory con-
dition of equipment. Computed or reported car turnaround in recent
years, taken in conjunction with the average haul, implies great
success in reverting to earlier levels of yard detention. It would appear
that over most of the Soviet period yard facilities have been kept at
a reasonable level of adequacy, save for the period of the early thirties
when some evidence of congestion appears as noted in Chapter 2
above.47
MOTIVE POWER UTILIZATION
Data on the Soviet locomotive stock, both in total and in composition,
as well as on its condition (serviceable, unserviceable, and stored), is
so incomplete and conjectural since 1940 as to make it hazardous to
undertake an analysis of the efficiency with which the stock is employed.
What can be said is almost wholly confined to the stock of road freight
locomotives. Nothing of moment is known about the utilization of
switching power and little about the use obtained from passenger
power. Reference to the notes to the appendix tables on locomotive
stock will make apparent the extent to which it has been necessary
to resort to estimates computed from operating data, i.e., locomotive-
miles derived from train-miles and then divided by average locomotive-
miles per locomotive-day to give an approximation of active road
freight locomotives. A further difficulty is presented by certain known
shifts in the method of reporting and the possibility that other un-
detected shifts have occurred. Nevertheless some discussion may be
useful if its highly provisional character is borne in mind.
As a measure of the intensity of use, locomotive-miles per locomotive-
day is commonly 'employed and, when average train speed is taken
into account, this can be convertedappropriately into the hours spent
on the road by the average locomotive. Comparisons have occasionally
been made between these data as reported by United States and by
47 Like main trackage, yard facilities are no doubt objects of very, intensive use.
A relatively constant flow of traffic contributes to this end but, at the cost of in.
creased switching engine andyardcrew hours, relatively small facilities can be
employed to' transit a heavy flow of traffic, as differences among, American yards
abundantly demonstrate.
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Soviet railroads—both of which employ a. statistic carrying in effect
the same title. There is, however, an important difference in coverage
and it is impossible to adjust the U.S. statistic to make it completely
comparable with the Soviet one. The U.S. datum is computed monthly
by multiplying average locomotives(serviceable and unserviceable,
but not including stored) on line by the days in the month and
dividing this product into total locomOtive-miles—principal, helper,
and light. In the Soviet case, unserviceable locomotives are excluded
from the working fleet as well as stored or reserve locomotives, and the
excluded unserviceables were adjusted after 1982 to include locomotives
awaiting or undergoing boiler wash. A more important difference,
however, is that operating averages are computed from actual loco-
motive-hOurs in the class of service reported, these data being secured
from engine house registers at maintaining engine houses. Hence the
statistics are different in kind, and one should expect locomotive-kilo-
meters per locomotive-day in the USSR to be substantially higher
than in the United States. Some notion of comparative intensity of
use can, however, be secured from comparison of locomotive-miles per
active locomotive-day as well as by another approach. Thus an impres-
sion of the plausibility of the reported Soviet performance can be
formed which makes it possible to judge whether the locomotive fleet,
reported for some years and estimated for others, is likely to be
adequate to move the traffic shown in the Soviet data. No refined
techni4ues are appropriate to the crude data with which it is necessary
to work.
Converted roughly into mileage, the recorded Soviet data for average
daily miles per locomotive in road freight service are as follows for
selected years:48
1930 93 1950 157
1935 118 1951 161
1940 159 1952 165
1945 138 1953 169
1949 145 1954 170
Forcomparison, certain select railroads in the United States are
shown in Table 18 below for various years during the steam era. The
roads represent a variety of conditions and the data are for the October
peaks of years of heavy traffic. The data for 1922 reflect the shortage of
power produced by the shopmen's strike of that year and are generally
higher than the adjacent years. The mileages shown have been cal-
48Seeseries C-25 in Appendix C for original and estimated data and explanatory
notes.
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TABLE 18
U.S. LOcoMoTIVE PERFORMANCE, SELECTEDYEARS
Locomotive-Miles Average TrainDaily Hours
per Locomotive-Day Speed,1944 on Road,
1922 1929 1944(miles per hour) 1944
New York Central 92.2 89.1 121.3 15.5 7.8
Pennsylvania 77.6 • 75.3 98.9 13.4 7.4
Santa Fe 103.1 111.3 154.9 17.5 8.8
Illinois Central 96.0 95.5 85.3 15.4 5.5
Union Pacific 126.1 141.5 149.2 18.5 8.1
New York, Chicago, '
•
and St. Louis 148.3 18.7 7.9
SOURCE: Operating Statistics of Large Steam Railroads, October 1922, 1929, and
1944, I.C.C.
culated from the operating statistics and represent locomotive-miles
per active locomotive-day (i.e., all locomotives not reported as either
stored or unserviceable are counted as active). The 1944 data illustrate
what could be accomplished under the heavy traffic pressure of a
peak war year and generally give the best results achieved in steam by
American railroads.
As the Soviet data compute locomotive-days from the time of loco-
motives in road freight service, they exclude waiting time beyond
twenty-four hours at the dispatching engine house which is included
in the locomotive-days from which the American data are calculated.
Moreover, pusher locomotives and locomotives in way freight and
transfer service are excluded from the Soviet data, these types of service
being some in which low daily mileage is normally secured. The
Soviet daily mileage is, therefore, to be associated with a larger number
of daily hours on the road for the average locomotive. This in turn
results from the less inclusive locomotive population employed in the
calculation. No comparable American statistic is available as loco-
motives are handled and reported in a different way in this country.
Soviet statistical instructions call for the systematic passage into
depot reserves of locomotives idle more than twenty-four hours and
for the transfer to railroad reserves of locomotives idle more than
ten days. These locomotives are excluded from the working fleet as
are those in process of transfer from one maintaining engine house
to another. An effort is apparently made to use locomotive-miles per
locomotive-day as a measure of the performance of the operating
department; hence care is taken to avoid charging to the locomotive
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time which instead should be charged to the mechanical department
or to a fluctuation in traffic volume.49
We may conclude: (1) that there is a difference of definition in the
Soviet and American statistics in the face of which we should expect
to find the average serviceable Soviet locomotive, not stored or in
transfer, to be in use more hours per day than its American counter-
part; and (2) that the conditions of Soviet rail operations, particularly
the greater freight train density and the lack of daily, weekly, and
seasonal fluctuations of the sort familiar to Western countries, permit
somewhat greater actual useful hours on the road per serviceable
locomotive-day. We are unable to assign weights to these two factors.
The higher apparent mileage per locomotive-day is a result of both
these factors and need not be regarded as exceptional, much less
impossible to attain. We may further conclude that the maintenance
of a favorable statistical showing from year to year is in part achieved
by manipulation of the road freight locomotive component of the
working fleet and that the uniformity in ratio between hours on the
road and hours consumed in a full turn (i.e., in the fraction of a day
that is spent on the road by the average locomotive) leaves open to
suspicion the data which purport to reflect intensity of use.
Composite passenger-ton-kilometers, a representation of total line-
haul output obtained by adding passenger-kilometers and ton-kilo-
meters,50 increased 664 per cent between 1928 and 1953.51 During
the same period the aggregate tractive effort of the inventory fleet of
locomotives increased by 196 per cent,52 while the number of loco-
motives in the inventory fleet increased 106 per cent.53 Obviously there
has been a remarkable intensification in motive power use if these
data are even remotely accurate, despite the fact that self-propelled
electric multiple-unit trains have accounted for much of the increase
in passenger-miles.
In the United States since 1929 there has been a dedine both in
the number of locomotive units and in the aggregate tractive effort.
The period since 1945 has been marked by rapid dieselization and, as
tractive effort provides a much less reliable measure of the capacity
49Carefulinstructions for the proper assignment of a day's locomotive time
between operating and mechanical departments and the reserves are given in
Iakubov, Osnovy zheiez. stalistiki,pp. 168 if.
5OCommon U.S. practice is to treat each passenger-kilometer as the equivalent
of two ton-kilometers, although some studies employ the ratio of average passenger-
mile revenues to average ton-mile revenues.
51Seeseries C-38.
82See series C-24.
53 See series C-23.
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of diesel than of steam power, comparison of years since that date with
earlier years becomes less useful as the share of diesel power increases.
As U.S. railroads now perform virtually 100 per cent of their work with
diesel or electric power, direct comparisons of U.S. and Soviet loco-
motive performance for the last five or six years are not feasible.
Certain comparisons up to 1947. will, however, give a rough idea of
the relationship of power to line-haul traffic in the two countries and
are given in Table 19. When it is borne in mind that a proper corn-
TABLE 19
LOCOMOTIVE PERFORMANCE, UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION, YEARS
Traffic Units Aggregate Tractive Traffic Units
(billion ton-kms. plus Effort per Ton of
billion passenger.kms.) (metric tons) Ti-active Effort
U.S. USSR U.S. USSR U.S. USSR
1929 765 145 1,176,800 192,600 68,817 75,285
1938 499 476 986,090 355,400 50,604 133,933
1944 1,332 n.a. 1,053,200 n.a. 126,567 n.a.
1946 1,043 467 1,047,200 425,000a 99,599 109,882
1947 1,099 476 1,040,000 440,000a
.105,673 108,180
1953 n.c. 900 n.c. 551,000 n. c. 163,340
SouRcE: For U.S., underlying data from Statistics of Railways in the United
States of each year, I.C.C.; for USSR, series C-38 and C-24 in Appendix C.
a Estimated.
n.c.not comparable.
parison would be in gross ton-miles which, in the Soviet data, would
be too far removed from statistics in which we can have some con:
fidence, these comparisons indicate the possibility that the Soviet roads
have achieved approximately the performance The data
for the two countries should be somewhat closer together in gross-ton-
miles, since the ratio of tare to total weight is higher in the United
States as a result of the higher percentage of empty car movement and
lighter average carload in proportion to light weight of cars. When, in
addition, allowance is made for the slower Soviet speeds in both freight
and passenger service, the light passenger trainload .characteristicof'
United States operations and the heavier average weight per revenue
seat provided, the relatively larger amount of switching work and of
light-traffic branch-line service to be performed in the United States,
and other factors, even the very high Soviet figure for 1953 loses most
of its improbability. U.S. motive power was under greatest pressure
in 1944, but even then it is doubtful, whether important parts of it
54 Here it should be remembered that the ton-kilometers employed for computing
the Soviet relationship are undoubtedly overstated.
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were, in the light of traffic conditions, capable of being usefully
employed for. as great a part of the average day as is feasible under
Soviet conditions, while there was some loss of potential capacity as
a result of crew shortage.It must also be recalled that the use of
locomotives in American practice is restrained by working agreements
with the operating unions which have no counterpart in Soviet
practice. The conditions of these agreements in particular occasion
the assignment of more switching power than would otherwise be
necessary and were not modified even in wartime.
Despite all differences, certain American roads have equaled or
exceeded the reported Soviet 1953 performance during years of pres-
sure; This applies notably to the' Santa Fe Road, which in 1943 and
1944 recorded approximately 163,00O traffic units per ton of aggregate
tractive effort, and to the Union Pacific, which exceeded 173,000 in
the same years. The Southern Pacific was not far behind. 'These and
other roads now have a higher level of performance, but as itis
achieved almost entirely with diesel power, it cannot be assigned
significance in testing Soviet performance, which has been primarily
in steam. All three of them, however, operate under more difficult
profile conditions than the. Soviet system, and even in the war years
they endeavored to maintain •a superlatively fast passenger and manifest
freight service while also handling a large number of special military
moves. The three taken together accounted for approximately 12 per
cent of the units of American railways. By way of contrast,
the Pennsylvania, which handles more than 10 per cent of the traffic
units, with its heavy passenger business, vast local freight business,
and relatively short hauls, achieved only 109,000 traffic units per ton
of tractive effort in 1944.
FREIGHT CAR EQUIPMENT
A great deal of attention has been focused on the rapid turnaround
reported to be achieved by the Soviet freight car stock. When due
consideration is accorded the long average haul, it does not imme-
diately appear plausible. The Russian railroads before World,War I
had a turnaround which, considering the short average haul and the
small capacity equipment employed, compared unfavorably• with
Western Europe and North America.55 During the late war years
and the revolutionary period, conditions appear to have worsened
materially and prewar turnaround was not approached again until
55 For turnaround data, see series C-29.
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1925/26. Thereafter a steady decline continued until the early 1930's
when the level fluctuated around 9.5 days. Under the pressure of the
"transportation crisis," this datum was forced down to 678 days in
1936 and thereafter was generally somewhat higher until, during the
war period, it advanced to substantially higher levels, attaining an
apparent maximum of 18.8 days in 1942. The postwar period has been
characterized by a rapid decline to 6.23 days in 1955 and 5.72 days in
1959, the last year for which a report is available. By contrast to these
rapid reported car turnarounds for the Soviet system, U.S. railroads
have only twice recorded a turnaround of less than fourteen days and
in the last few years have encountered turnarounds exceeding fifteen
days. Attention has already been called to the longer average hauls
prevailing in the Soviet Union, as well as to certain Other factors
affecting car turnaround. It is necessary to undertake here a more
systematic appraisal.
The concepts employed in the two countries are similar but not
necessarily the same. 6 Both relate the stock of serviceable cars on
line to the cars loaded.. The Soviets appear to exclude inactive and
light repair cars, however, both of which are included in the United
States turnaround as ordinarily computed. Car turnaround is thus a
calculated datum whose accuracy depends upon the accuracy of the
record of cars on line and of the reporting of cars loaded. In neither
country are actual serviceable car-days available, the size of the stock
being taken at a given date (reported on the first and fifteenth of the
month in United States practice) and applied to. the carloadings of
a more extended period. Car turnaround differs, of course, not only
from year to year, but from month to month. Thus in United States
practice, car turnaround reachesits minimum ordinarily in the
October peak weeks. The best reported performances for the four
highest consecutive weeks calculated from October 1 serviceable cars
on line less minimum surpluses appear to have been those of October
1929 and October 1939 at 11.7 and 11.3 days The 1989
turnaround was exceeded in every year of World War II and, under
the influence of the five-day week and other changed conditions, turn-
around has assumed a generally higher level, in more recent peak
periods.
56 Active, serviceable, or "working" car stock divided by carloadings. Thus the
ratio is intended to give elapsed time from one loading to another.
57 Calculated by the Association of American Railroads and reported to the Office
of Defense Mobilization for use of the "Conway" Committee on rolling stock
requirements.
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Whereas the accuracy of U.S. data for serviceable cars on line can
be accepted, the reported surplus is normally understated and tends
to vary in accuracy with the supply of and demand for cars. Hence
any calculation which seeks comparability with the Soviet concept by
employing active cars to compute turnaround tends to overstate United
States car turnaround. On the other hand, Soviet records of cars in
existence and on line are loose and would appear to be easily subject
to manipulation. Our conclusion is that the number of active cars
on line, the "working fleet," is understated and that the percentage
of understatement varies from time to time and is related to the
contemporaneous pressures for a good statistical showing.. In short,
the figureis manipulated.It appears impossible to develop any
measure of the understatement, but the existence of a bias contrary to
that of the U.S. data should continually be borne in mind. Nor can
the possibility of accretion in the percentage of understatement of
the Soviet "working fleet" be discounted completely. An understate-
ment of 10 per cent in the "working fleet," which is far from improb-
able, would increase a reported turnaround of seven days to 7.8 days.
We have no basis for suggesting that the understatement is of this
order of magnitude, however, and it could exceed this level.
This is a matter of considerable importance, for it indicates a larger
investment in rolling stock than we are led to expect by the published
data purporting to show the ownership of freight cars. Moreover, since
it means an understatement of car turnaround, confidence that this
equipment is understated can diminish our suspicion of the ability of
carriers to handle the reported traffic as represented by carloadings.SS
It is desirable, therefore, to review the evidence that leads us to this
conclusion.59 This necessitates some discussion of our understanding
of Soviet car accounting for, more than anything else, the looseness
in the system of car accounting leads us to expect substantial under-
statement, and we find this conclusion reinforced in those years for
which a check of in and out movement in the fleet with the reported
inventory has been possible.6° It appears that the Soviet statistics of
cars available to the railroad service(inventory fleet)rest not on
what is in effect a perpetual inventory, as on American railroads, but
on physical inventories taken each year with a resulting adjustment of
58 Our appraisal of ton-kilometrage appears in Chapter 2.
59 Disparity between growth of the inventory and working fleets and the data
upon cars built and retired has been noted in Chapter 2 and is discussed at greater
length in Appendix A.
60 The discussion here, of course, refers to car turnaround computed by dividing
the working fleet by average daily carloadings.
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the account when particular car numbers fail to appear in the inven-
tory for a prescribed number of consecutive years.61 Additions to the
fleet are not necessarily recorded except as they are picked up through
the count, while cars actually in existence and hitherto recorded may
be dropped as a result of their failure to• be picked up in the count.
Moreover, the portion of this stock attributed to the working fleet is
subject to manipulation by transfers to bad order, to reserve, to other
ministries by lease,to railroad construction, to use for company
material and other railroad service, and to the Ministry fleet, among
other possibilities.62 The absence of per diem settlement .between the
several railroads making up the system leaves a gap in the statistics of
car movement and car location because of the failure of car interchange
reports to reflect accurately the movement.
To ascertain car stock by a physical count of cars on the line is a
method which at best leads to understatement. Cars at outlying sidings
and nonagency points are likely to escape the count. Even in yards
and in large industrial districts cars are likely to be ignored. On
American railroads many instances come to light of serviceable cars
which have been allowed to stand idle from failure of notice for
extended periods of time sometimes exceeding a year. Such cars have
not been reported to the car distributor as available for loading.
Many more such instances undoubtedly exist than reach the attention
of the supervisors and car service agents of the Association of American
Railroads and of the Interstate Commerce Commission. But such
cars on an American road are included in the serviceables reported on
line and enter the calculation of car turnaround, for the car record
office, quite independently of the 7 A.M. or other counts, maintains
a perpetual inventory adjusted by installations, retirements, cars
delivered to connections, and cars received from connections, which is
reduced only by the count of cars reported surplus and in bad order
when computing car turnaround.63Under the American system
there is no incentive actually to fail to detect the existence of service-
able cars, although yardmasters and agents may be tempted to hold
61 At inventory, or "census," time an effort is apparently made to hold railroad
operatiàns to a minimum until the census can be completed.Detailed instruc-
tions issued for the taking of the census appear designed to secure as much accuracy
as possible.
62 It is also unclear whether cars which pass onto trackage of other ministries in
connection with industrial switching, loading, and unloading operations are in-
chided in the working fleet.
63 Bad-order cars are, however, subject to manipulation—usually to understate-
ment where pressure is exerted to increase the serviceable fleet.Such understate-
ment necessarily increases car turnaround.
114ANALYSIS OF SOVIET RAILWAY OPERATION
It is necessary, if car turnaround is to be understood, to obtain
some conception of its composition, that is, to account for the time
of the car spent in the various activities between one loading and
the next. Soviet students have from time to time undertaken analyses—
indeed a good bit of attention has been concentrated on the subject.
Less study has been accorded it elsewhere in the world and only one
effort has been made in the United States to secure an actual record
of the history of the movement of a large number of cars under load—
that of the Federal Coordinator who did not, however, study the
complete car turnaround. The adoption of machine methods is now
leading some U.S. railroads to study the movement of cars on their
own lines. For the present, however, we must work with a paucity
of material. Table 20 sets out two calculations of turnaround on U.S.
railroads made at widely separated times, but the later one is based
on the method and on some of the assumptions of the earlier one,
together with a breakdown of Soviet car turnaround at several different
times, given in days.. Except for much heavier proportions of less-
than-carload freight than has ever characterized Soviet rail operation,
the U.S. performance of 1910 probably comes the closest to Soviet
conditions. That of 1954 departs so far from conditions in the Soviet
Union as to afford an unsatisfactory basis for comparison. Undoubtedly,
the turnaround in peak months was somewhat less than that shown in
Loree's 1910 analysis, but we may nevertheless proceed to some com-
parisons which accept his estimates as a point of departure and employ
the Soviet 1940 data as representative, although not the lowest on
record.
The differences in the line-haul portion of the account result from a
U.S. turnaround trip (loaded plus empty) in 1910 of 571 kilometers
compared with a Soviet turnaround in 1940 of 1,032 kilometers, while
the U.S. road speed in that year was 16 kilometers compared with
20.3 kilometers for the USSR in 1940. The average U.S. car is
assumed to have encountered 5.4 intermediate yardings and inter-
changes on this average haul; the Soviet car, approximateJy 10 inter-
mediate yardings over its longer haul. Zagliadimov reports an average
delay of 6.5 hours per intermediate yarding, while the Loree estimate
supposes 17.9 hours for the U.S. average intermediate yarding or
interchange. Neither the Soviet nor the Loree estimates represent an
actual accounting for elapsed car time between receipt and dispatch.
Interchange between U.S. roads frequently involves a double yarding
plus the loss of time on interchange tracks. Thus the U.S. yardings
should be increased by 3.6 to obtain greater comparability, resulting
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cars to protect loading in their own territory and thus fail to report
them as surplus to the car distributor. Under the Soviet system,
however, a premium is placed upon failure to report the existence
and location of cars because of the emphasis on operating norms which
derive from the size of the car stock. The presence of underreporting
is appreciated and is frequently commented upon with examples that
have been discovered in the Soviet railroad press. Hence a system
which would in any event tend to understatement would appear to
become a worse instrument as a result of the stimulus to increase the
downward bias by nonreporting.Moreover, cars accumulated for
seasonal loading are specifically excluded from the working fleet. No
confidence can be developed in the significance of data developed
within such a system nor can any precise interpretation of freight car
turnaround be developed in consequence.
Because of the importance attached to the intensive use of cars,
however, Soviet railroads use a more direct and more complicated
method for securing current information on turnaround. This method
builds up the several elements which, when added, give car turnaround




technicalspeed of trains section speed of trains
The difference between these gives the time spent at way stations.
Major intermediate yards compute yard detention hourly on the basis
of the car Count at 6 PM. plus receipts less dispatchments. Origin
and destination stations keep records of each car received or dispatched,
showing by car number the time attributable to loading and unloading,
separated into operations conducted by the railroad and those con-
ducted by other enterprises, and time spent in yard operations.
Detailed instructions are given for the inclusion or exclusion of cars
from the working fleet. A disparity, called undistributed time, exists
between the aggregate car time accounted for in this manner and the
total car time of the working fleet calculated as previously described.
This has run in recent years between 2 and 2.5 per cent of total
car time compared with 10 per cent in 1940.Since 1952 the un-
accounted-for time has been distributed proportionately among the
several elements making up the complete car turnaround.64
64 Jakubov1 Osnovy zhelez. statistiki, pp.168 if.
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TABLE 20
COMPARISON OF FREIGHT CAR TURNAROUND TIME, UNITED STATES AND




1910a 1954b 1934c 1935c l94&' 1958'
Road movement
(loaded plus empty) 1.49 1.53
Road delays 0.15 0.19 3.02 2.66 2.11 1.86
Intermediate yards








repair tracks 1.34 1.52 g g g
Surplus cars and
movement to and
from storage 0.75 g g g
Total responsibility
of railway 9.50 9.92 6.86 6.10 5.01 4.05
Loading and unloading 4.00 4.00
Delay because of bill
to order, reconsign-
ment, plant use, etc. 0.50 0.50 1.91 1.61 2.36
Delay due to Sundays,
Saturdays, and 7 holi-
days per year 0.90 1.22
Total responsibility
of shipper 5.40 5.72 1.91 1.61 2.36 1.77
Total turnaround 14.90 15.64 8.751' 7.691' 7.37 5.83
a L. F. Loree, Railroad Freight Transportation, New York, 1922, pp. 268 f.
b L. K. Silicox, "Goal: 100 Miles a Day," Railway Age, Nov. 28, 1955, p. 31.
C See Appendix A.
d Zagliadimov. Organizatsiia dvizheniia, p. 384.
e Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1958 [The USSR National Economy in 1958],
Moscow, 1959, p. 556.
f It is possible that movement to and from loading tracks in the Soviet data is
included in the figure given below for loading and unloading rather than here.
g Light repair cars, while included in the U.S. serviceable stock, are believed to
be excluded from the Soviet "working fleet."Hence this element disappears from
Soviet turnaround. The same is true of surplus cars.
h Total does not agree with detail because of rounding.
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in an average detention of 10.7 hours. Soviet yard detention at stations
with a car turnover exceeding 200 cars daily is computed on the basis
of cars on hand each hour, the figure being presumed to remain
unchanged until the next hourly Count. The car-hours thus determined
are divided by one-half the sum of the cars received and dispatched.
Cars received and dispatched in solid trains are included in the count.
It is probable that a tendency to underreport cars on hand reduces
this figure, but some of the differences between Soviet and U.S.
detention result from different conditions, e.g., a more even flow of
cars through yards over the week, the absence of so large a branch-line
network, the absence of a great multiplicity of routings between prin-
cipal points which compel the longer holding of cars for many classi-
fications, the absence of prior classification as an accepted practice on
U.S. railroads in 1910, and the much heavier freight traffic density
on the Soviet roads in 1940 than prevailed on U.S. roads in 1910.
As it appears that the movement to and from loading tracks of shippers
is not included in the Soviet data on detention at intermediate yards
and neither the light repair of cars nor the movement and storage
of surplus cars is included in Soviet turnaround, we may reduce the
duration of the U.S. railroad responsibility of 9.50 days by the sum
of these elements, or 3.83 days, giving a figure of 5.67 days to compare
with the Soviet 5.01.It will be observed, however, that the Soviet
figure had been brought down by almost a day by 1958.
When 1.74 days for movement between terminal yard and loading
and unloading tracks is added to the 5.40 days shown as the respon-
sibility of the shipper in the United States, we have 7.14 days for U.S.
turnaround to compare with 2.36 days in the Soviet Union. The latter
is in effect a residual, and it is understated to the extent that the
active car stock is understated, but overstated to the extent that
detention at intermediate terminals may have been minimized. The
items for delay because of Sundays, holidays, and traders' practices
presumably have no counterpart in the Soviet system that is in any
respect comparable. If they are deducted we have: United States, 5.74
days; USSR, 2.36 days.These remnants presumably represent in
each country the movement of the empty to the point of loading,
loading the car, switching the load to train yard of origin, switching
the loaded car to the unloading track at destination, unloading the
car, and switching out the empty. Not all of these moves are en-
countered in every car turnaround as cars unloaded at a plant may in
both countries be appropriated for outbound loading. This practice
may well be more common in the Soviet Union than here because of
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the lesser diversity of car types, but there should not be any great
differences, from our 1910 conditions as the bulk of specialized cars
are of more recent development.
Although it is believed that the understatement of turnaround is
primarily concentrated in the element now under discussion, it is to
be observed thatthe outstanding favorable factor for high car
utilization on the Soviet railroadsis the enforced cooperation of
shippers in the prompt loading and unloading of cars. From what
is known under this head, it would appear that instead of four days
for loading and unloading in the United States, not more than one
day should be allowed in Soviet practice. Hence our residuals come
very close together and it would appear that the differences in turn-
around can, for the most part, be explained. The available evidence
indicates that shipping and receiving divisions of industrial plants
are expected tO perform loading and unloading operations around the
clock seven days a week and to speed up car movement even when
other plant sections are closed on Sundays and official holidays. Daily
carloading data support this presumption, for the available daily
carloading data for 1933 and 1934 do not indicate any significant
weekly periodicity.65 Whereas American shippers have been accorded
forty-eight hours free time computed from the first 7 A.M. afterthe
car is placed for loading or unloading, Sundays and holidays excluded,
and are protected against bunching and against many adverse weather
conditions which may affect the unloading of certain types of freight,
Soviet shippers are given norms adjusted to the commodity and size
of car and expressed in hours. In addition, American shippers generally
enjoy an extra twenty-four hours free time for each diversion or
recoñsignment and in movements that require transfers to water
carriers up to seven days free time is commonly provided, sometimes
more in the export trades.It appears that, on the average, shippers
come close to utilizing the free time available to them. Ordinarily
penalty demurrage is not assessed, the standard demurrage rate differ-
ing little from the per diem rental rate and being ordinarily insufficient
to discourage the holding of cars. Nor are incentives accorded for
quicker car handling except as average agreements may permit fast
handling of some cars to offset the slow handling of others. Inciden-
65A.lakobi, Zhëleznye dorogi SSSR v tsifrakh [USSR Railroads in Figures],
Moscow, 1985, pp. 114-117.This factor also helps explain the greater average
terminal detention of U.S. railroads, for a marked reduction in car dispatchments
normally occurs on Sundays and holidays and certain classifications cannot be
dispatched in the absence of train service.
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tally, the demurrage tariff does not apply to cars loaded at coal mines
where the holding of no-bills66 sometimes goes to extremes.
The established Soviet norms for the loading and unloading of
cars by shippers are given by Popatov as they, apply to nonmechanized
operations.67 They are differentiated by commodity and by type of
car. They range from one hour for piece goods in cars with a capacity
of under forty tons to five hours for glass, bottles, etc., in cars with
a capacity of over forty tons..Fines are collected by the railroads for
the detention of cars beyond the established norms while premiums
are paid to shippers and receivers of freight for accelerated loading
and unloading of equipment.°8 It appears, hOwever, that loading and
unloading norms are, from time to time, adjusted and that shipping
ministries can, on occasion, bring effective pressure to bear to secure
more liberal norms.Moreover, in recent years certain ministries,
notably those for coal, metals, lumber, construction materials, have
tended to fail to meet the norms and hence have come in for a good
deal of criticism.69 Apparently the railroads have not been without
fault, for Beshchev, calling attention to the fact that detention in
loading and unloading has been slow in decreasing and stood in 1953
at 2.3 hours above 1940, criticized railway managements for increasing
norms without cause.70 The action of the Tomsk Railroad in raising
the norm for the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Combine from 9.5 hours in
1950 to 17.7 hours in 1953 is cited with marked disapproval. The
decline in 1953 in what is referred to as "idle time" at shippers' sidings
was only 0.7 hours, according to Beshchev, and total turnaround time
was short of the goal by approximately one hour.Shippers were
called upon to deliver loaded cars more evenly throughout the hours
of the day. The decided difference in relationships between shipper
and carrier in the Soviet Union, compared with the United States, is
adequately discussed elsewhere and need not be dealt with further
here.71 That it has a significant favorable effect upon car turnaround
cannot be doubted.
In considering the over-all effects of the rapid car handling that
appears to be enforced, it is well to observe that a rapid car turn-
66No-billsare cars loaded prior to preparation of bill of lading, often because
the contents have not been sold and the destination is, therefoie, unknown.
67V.P. Popatov and A. T. Deribas, Kommercheskaia eksploatatsiia zhe!eznylth
dorog SSSR [Commercial Operation of USSR Railroads), Moscow, 1950, Appendix
4, p. 899.
68Ibid.,p. 111.
69L.M. Kaganovich, in Pravda, May 24, 1954, p. 3.
70B.P. Beshchev, then Minister of Transport, in Pravda, May 19, 1954, p. 2.
71Hunter,Soviet Transportation, pp. 128-130.
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around is secured in considerable part by higher proportionate inputs—
in all likelihood, primarily labor inputs—by shipping and receiving
installations.Scant evidence has come to our attention concerning
facilities or methods used by Soviet industrial plants, but the impres-
sion created is of the use of overwhelming quantities of ordinary labor.
A larger portion of freight, perhaps 40 per cent of the total, moreover,
moves through railroad-operated freight stations and is thus loaded
and unloaded by railroad forces.72
Certain Measures of Efficiency
Despite important misrepresentations in the Soviet statistics,itis
apparent that an intensive utilization of permanent way, terminals,
motive power, and equipment is secured. This is achieved, in part,
at the expense of heavy inputs of other resources. Although only a
fragmentary picture can be constructed of these other inputs which
affect the efficiency of operations, some insight can be secured from
the data developed in connection with this study. Serious difficulties
of interpretation and comparison, however, confront the student.
FUEL
A major input in railroad transportation is fuel which, in the Soviet
case, is still almost entirely coal.73It is customary to measure the
consumption in pounds per thousand gross ton-miles or other such
units. Such a measure is reported for the Soviet railroads, but it is
quite obviously not computed on the same basis as for U.S. railroads
and does not, therefore, afford a direct basis of comparison. The
Soviet data, presumably applying to all classes of freight and passenger
service, in kilograms per 10,000 gross ton-kilometers are given in
Table 21. U.S. data are given in pounds of coal per thousand gross
ton-miles for freight service only. In earlier years passenger service
fuel consumption was reported on a ton-mile basis. There are im-
portant differences in the methods of reporting data, however. The
Soviet data equate all fuel to a 7,000-calorie per kilogram standard,
whereas the U.S. data are based on actual tons consumed but equate
oil fuel and electricity on a calorie basis to the average characteristics
72Bycontrast, over 90 per cent of freight in the United States other than that
transshipped to or from water moves between industrial sidings and, of the re-
mainder, the greatest part is loaded and unloaded by shippers and receivers.
73Fuelapproximates 18 per cent of transportation expenses of Class I railroads
of the United States and approximately 82 per Cent of all purchases of supplies and
materials.
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TABLE 21
LOCOMOTIVE FUEL CONSUMPTION, SOVIET RAILROADS, 1928-40 AND 1945-59
(kgs. of .7,000-calorie units per 10,000grosston-kms in freight,































SOURCE: 1928, 1932, 1937, 1940, 1950-58: Iakubov, Oinovy zhelez. statistiki, p.
248;1929, 1933-35: Sotsialisticheskoestroitel'stvo SSSR [Socialist Construction in the
USSR], Moscow, 1936, p. 435; 1939, 1945-57: Hunter, Soviet Transportation, p. 307;
1948-49:Tekhnicheskiispravochnik zheleznodorozhnika (A Technical Handbook
for Railway Men], Moscow, 1955, Vol.II, p.243, where the figures are displaced by one
year;1959: Zheleznodorozhnyi transport [Railroad Transportation), 1960, No. 3,
p. 85.
of coal burned on each individual railroad. They are not, therefore,
designed to be comparable between railroads, and the average con-
sumption for the system cannot be referred to a specific quality of coal.
Finally, the Russian data are roughly 65 per cent of actual con-
sumption, this adjUstment being made in recognition of "the coefficient
of useful action of the steam boiler. ..
74T.S. Khachaturov, Ekonoinika [The Economics of Transportation].
Moscow, 1959, pp. 214-215.
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The U.S. data for a selection of years prior to extensive dieselization,
and for freight service, Class I railroads, are:
Pounds of Coal per 1,000 Gross Ton-Miles 75
1936 119 1945 116
1938 115 1946 116
1940 112 1947 114
1942 111 1948 111
Itwould be illustrative to convert the Soviet data into pounds per
thousand gross ton-miles, but, as indicated, no direct comparisons can
be made because of the difference in the• method of computing the
average and because the Soviet figure includes the passenger service.
The best Soviet prewar performance was in 1940, which was the
equivalent of 128.4 pounds per thousand gross ton-miles. This was
a substantial improvement over 1929 when the figure stood at 145
pounds. Postwar consumption was higher for a few years, reaching
a peak of 144.7 pounds in 1947. Since then improvement has been
steady and the figure, for steam locomotives only, reached 101.5 pounds
in 1953. Substantial modernization of Soviet steam power in recent
years no doubt contributed to the sharp reduction in consumption in
the period since 1947, as did the retirement of older power and
replacement with new. Great emphasis has also been placed upon fuel
economy. Yet it seems impossible fully to explain so great an improve-
ment.
For 1940, however, we may approach the problem in another way.
The transport industries are reported to have consumed 49.5 million
tons of coal in that year, or 30.0 per cent of total coal consumption
for all purposes.76 The exact coverage of this consumption is not
wholly clear, but information on the use of other fuels has a bearing
on it.Little wood appears to have been used for locomotive fuel in
1940. In 1942 some conversion to wood firing is reported on the
Northern Railway and apparently in scattered fashion elsewhere.
Wood reached 11.5 per cent of total consumption in 1943, but by 1946
was down to 0.3 per cent. Petroleum fell from 8.1 per cent in 1940
to 6.8 per cent in 1.43 and to 2.6 per cent in 1946. Brown coal,
however, increased from 6.3 per cent in 1940 to 17.02 per cent in
1943 and 21.6 per cent in 1946. It is not clear whether the figure given
for 1940 transport consumption includes or excludes brown coal.77
75 Statistics of Railways in the United States, 1946 and 1948, I.C.C., Table 60.
76N. A. Voznesenskii, Voennaia ekonomika SSSR v period otechestvennoi voiny
[Soviet War Economy During World War II], Moscow, 1948, p. 69.
77 Comparability with U.S. data is, therefore, in doubt.The U.S. data include
ligni tes.
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We may reduce Soviet consumption by 10 per cent to eliminate
consumption by transport other than rail. We may reduce gross ton-
kilometers by 8 per cent to eliminate those produced by use of
petroleum fuel and by 10 per cent for those produced by electric power.
Gross ton-kilometers must, however, be estimated. At Soviet load
factors and equipment weights, passenger-kilometers come close to
measuring gross ton-kilometers in passenger train service.Freight
car-kilometers can be estimated from average kilometers per car-day
and from the number of cars reported in the working fleet. An average
weight per two-axle unit ca.n be assumed. The resulting data may be
converted into ton-miles. Thus we have 486.1 billion gross ton-miles
produced by coal-burning steam locomotives with a consumption of
44.7 million metric tons of coal, or 49.17 million short tons. In 1940,
96 per cent of U.S. gross ton-miles, or 1,134.6 billion, were produced
by steam power with a consumption of 96.1 million equivalent tons
of coal.78 Thus we have 9.9 billion gross ton-miles produced on the
Soviet railroads for each million tons of coal, compared with 11.8
billion ton-miles per million tons of coal on U.S. railroads in that year.
Such a comparison is by no means conclusive, involving as it does a
number of estimates and adjustments as well as some doubt about the
comparability of the basic data. From the known characteristics of
Soviet steam power, however, it would appear certain that con-
sumption would be heavier per thousand gross ton-miles on equivalent
profile than for the more modern and complicated power prevalent
in the United States in 1940. On the whole, Soviet profile appears
to be more favorable than is the case on American roads, which would
suggest that, with power of equivalent thermal efficiency similarly
maintained, with similar quality of coal, and with equally efficient
firing, Soviet consumption should be less than United States con-
sumption per thousand gross ton-miles.These• equivalences quite
dearly did not exist and heavier consumption results.
LABOR
There appears to be no doubt that employment on the Soviet railroads
far exceeds our own and that productivity per worker, as measured
in composite freight and passenger ton-miles per worker, is much
lower. No sharply defined conclusions should be drawn from the
78Oil burnedin steam power was converted into coal equivalents in accordance
with I.C.C. reporting requirements on the basis described earlier. These equivalents
for individual railroads are given in Statistics of Railways in the United States,
I.C.C., 1946, Table 73.
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dataas thecoverage of the Soviet operating labor force is not fully
understood while our own employment by steam railroads has been
affected from time to time by the amount and character of work placed
with outside firms, by fluctuations in the amount of construction, and
by the degree to which such construction has been contracted for
rather than performed by the carriers' own forces. Much such work is
mixed in character. Not since 1929, however, have American railroads
(including the Pullman Company and express companies) had as
high an employment as the Soviet railroads have shown in each of
the last three years.
Data on the Soviet railway labor force are given in series C-39 and
C-40 in Appendix C. It will be observed that series C-40, which gives
estimates of the operating labor force, is occasionally derived from
the productivity data of series C-39 and the composite traffic data of
series C-38. It will also be noticed that, during a part of the period,
it has been possible to compute a more inclusive series which also
embraces the employees in the work train service. The bulk of new
railroad construction is performed by other organizations whose em-
ployees are not included here. Undoubtedly, however, much work
train service is operated in support of such construction.
The precise content of the railway operating labor force is difficult
to determine from the available data, and a reconciliation of its
composition with that of U.S. railroads calls for considerable specula-
tion. The distribution by "railroad management branches" is given





Freight car service 11.0
Passenger service 6.8
Signaling and communications service 4.2
Commercial service 2.6
Building and installation maintenance 0.8
Railroad division and administrative agencies 4.0
Other 7.1
Total 100.0
The classification differs fundamentally from that employed in
the United States sinceit mixes transportation and maintenance
functions and thus makes direct comparisons impossible. Were the
full detail of the Soviet labor force known in a breakdown similar to
79I.V. Kochetov, Zheleznodorozhnaia statistika [Railroad Statistics], 2nd ed.,
Moscow,1953, pp. 156 if.
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that. of the United States by type of position, a more effective analysis
could be undertaken. Some immediate differences both in coverage
and function are, however, obvious. Some components of the Soviet
work force are absent in the American system, e.g., political agencies
and other which account for 4.5 per cent of the Soviet
railroad force. The identifiable administrative echelons of the Soviet
system are at much lower strength than in the American system. The
traffic departments of American railroads—rates, sales, advertising, and
industrial development—have but a feeble counterpart. The personnel
required for certain functions, e.g., heavy locomotive and car repair
and new line construction, are included in the Ministry staffs, as are.
the personnel charged with the primary budget functions, whereas in
the United States these are included in the employment of the rail-
ways.8O As the majority of timber-treating plants are operated inde-
pendently or by subsidiàriés in the United States, their inclusion in
Ministry forces does not appear to add another element of incompara-
bility. A primary obstacle to understanding the composition of the
Soviet railway force is, however, the difference in the reporting of
personnel bytheprimary functions of railway operation, which at
least suggests a difference in organization concepts.8' In attempting
TABLE 22
DISTRIBUTION OF RAILROAD LABOR FORCE IN UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNIoN, 1950
(per cent)
United States Soviet Union
Transportation
Train and engine service 20.9 Locomotiveservice 23.6
Yard forces 13 Traffic management 17.6
Other 11 6 Freight car service 11.0
Passenger car .service 6.8
Maintenance of equipment 28.2
Total 62.0 Total 59.0
Maintenance of way 19.7 Maintenance of way (mci. 28.0
signals, buildings, and
electrification)
Professional, clerical, general 18.3 Other 13.0
Total 100.0 Total 100.0
SouRcE: For U.S., Statistics of Railways in the United States, I.C.C., 1950; for
USSR, see text above.
80 I.V. Zheleznodorozhnaia statistika[Railroadstatistics],1sted.,
Moscow, 1948, p. 163.
81 It would appear, for example, that the locomotive department more nearly
parallels British than American practice, embracing not Only the shop and engine
house force8 but the engine crews as well.
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to compare the Soviet, with the U.S. distribution of workers, we must
effect combinations that deprive the totals even of certain principal
breakdowns commonly employed in summary employment statistics,
for we must combine transportation and maintenance of equipment
categories (see Table 22). Maintenance of equipment is underrepre-
seined in this comparison since the heavy repair forces are under the
Ministry. Such forces are the equivalent of 8.8 per cent of the railway
operating staff and their addition would bring the transportation
and maintenance of equipment forces to a percentage slightly above
that for the United States. So far as appears from these data—and the
evidence is highly inconclusive—the principal difference in composition
of the Soviet working force in the major departments of operation is
the much larger proportion of the force devoted to maintenance of
way. This is to be expected in view of the limited degree of mechaniza-
tion of trackwork in the Soviet system.82 -
Whatlittle evidence there is suggests that the operating labor force
as reported for the Soviet railways is somewhat less inclusive than that
reported by railways of the United States.83 Other differences that
affect productivity calculations concern the count of workers upon
which the force is based. The U.S. data represent the averages of
twelve midmonth counts. The Soviet data employed for the produc-
tivity calculations appear to be developed from actual hours worked
adjusted to standard per worker expectancy. There is the possibility
that a difference in concept results, therefore, in a relative overstate-
ment of workers employed on. the U.S. railways. We are not in
possession of man-hours worked on the Soviet railways, hence we
cannot progress to hourly productivity data which would be far more
useful than those which we possess.Nevertheless we may acquire
some notion of the relative inputs of labor if we relate the available
data to the traffic data. As we do so, we should bear in mind the
upward bias of Soviet traffic data and the probable downward bias
of employment data.If, therefore, we find a larger labor input per
traffic unit in the Soviet Union, we shall have understated the
difference.
Because of differences in the quality of service, both freight and
passenger, it would be desirable to develop measures of the volume
82Bycontrast, mechanization of trackwork for new construction appears to have
been carried rather far along lines similar to British railways.
83Asthe categories which account for the overwhelming proportion of operating
and maintenance workers are contained in the series of both countries, this is not
a bar to securing some general understanding of the relative use of labor.
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of service produced weighted by value. This we are unable to do and
must confine ourselves to the employment of ton-mile data.As
observed elsewhere, the Soviet composite traffic seriesisa simple
addition of ton- and which isa reasonable
meshing of the series to represent probable gross ton-kilometers in the
two services. Passenger service in the United States is, however, of a
different order and is operated according tO entirely different standards
for speed, •weight of equipment per seat, passenger load factor, non-
revenue space, and other matters. While there are certainly differences
in the quality of freight service, notably in train speed, these differences
are smaller than in the passenger service.In comparing the two
systems to secure some approximation of labor productivity, we would
be fully justified in assigning greater weight to passenger-miles in the
United States series. The disparity, however, turns out to be so great
that no considerable speculation on this point is useful. The data
are developed in Table 23.
TABLE 23
COMPARISON OF LABOR PRoDuCTIvITY IN UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNIoN,
SELECTED
•
United Statesa Soviet Unionb
Operating Composite .
Metric Ton- Ton-KilometersTon-Kilometers
Kilometersc Employeesd per Employeeper Employee
(billions) (thousands) (thousands) (thousands)
1930 661.1 1,517 435.8 204.4
1932 404.1 1,052 384.1 247.4
1934 462.0 1,027 449.8 251.6
1936 584.1 1,086 587.9 836.9
1988 499.2 958 521.1 358.8
1940 635.4 1,046 . 607.5 380.6
1945 1,215.2 1,439 844.5 273.9
1949 879.0 1,207 728.2 373.4
• 1950 '762.5 1,236 778.7 409.9
1953 981.6 1,221 803.9 488.7
1954 890.4 1,079 825.2 506.6
1956 1,025.6 1,123 913.3 622.4
1958 889.1 908 979.2 737.8
a From Statistics of Railways in the United Slates, I.C.C., of each year.
b Series C-39, col. 2, in Appendix C..
c Net ton-miles converted to metric ton-kilometers plus passenger-kilometers.
d All line-haul railroads.Excludes switching andterminalcompanies, Pullman
Company, and express companies.
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It will be observed that a substantial drop in productivity occurred
in the Soviet system during the war and that, although the position
improved with some rapidity, it was not until a year after the prewar
traffic level had been passed that prewar labor productivity was
attained, and passed. In the U.S. system it will be observed that the
wartime level of 1945 was not again attained until after 1954, despite
the extensive naechanization of trackwork and wholesale dieselization.
Declining traffic is unfavorable to high labor productivity. Moreover,
a fundamental shift was produced by the adoption of the forty-hour
week for various classes of employees in 1947-50. That Soviet railroads
since 1950 appear to have exceeded the U.S. level of 1930 must be
regarded as a creditable performance in the light of the tools with
which they have to work. An argument can be made, however, that
as late as 1954 Soviet productivity had not attained our 1930 level,
if proper allowance could be made for the bias of the Soviet data and
for the differences in the quality of service rendered by the two
systems.Improvement has continued and the 1958 record was as
good as the best U.S. prewar performance. Soviet productivity should
continue to increase as maintenance-of-way workers are better provided
with equipment and as dieselization progresses. The latter should not
only permit increased train loading and more rapid yard work, but
also a reduction in the size of train crews and the elimination of second
engine crews when double-heading is resorted to, except where mixed
equipment requires the second engine to be cut into the middle of
the train. The margin between U.S. and Soviet productivity has
obviously been narrowing, and this trend may be expected to continue
with dieselization of the Soviet system. As the next section suggests,
the Soviet railways appear to be securing far more salutary results from
diseselization than U.S. railroads have achieved.
Effects of Partial Dieselization
The comparisons in this chapter thus far have been confined largely
to the Soviet experience before 1954 when more than .90 per cent of
the freight working was carried out by steam traction. The U.S. data
employed for comparison .havegenerally not been later than 1944
when more than 94 per cent of U.S.. road freight service was still
accomplished behind steam locomotives. The substantial transition'
of power in both countries, although it is very recent in the Soviet
Union, makes possible some appraisal of the effects of the shift in the
two countries. Such an appraisal is subject to many qualifications, the
most serious of which are:
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1. Soviet freight traffic has been increasing rapidly during the period
of transition, whereas that of U.S. railroads has exhibited a
declining trend which has been punctuated by a number of years of
depressed traffic volume, and the year during which U.S. roads neared
the Soviet 1960 percentage of steam working was a badly depressed year.
•2. Soviet steam power at the time the transition began was generally
of lesè modern design, smaller average unit capacity, and lower
efficiency than that in service on U.S. railroads at the beginning of
the transition.
These differences in part explain the greater improvement in the
Soviet performance which has occurred, but it is questionable whether
they do so completely. The comparative periods of transition are
shown in Table 24. Thus it will appear that, broadly speaking, U.S.
TABLE 24
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL GROSS FREIGHT TON-KILOMETERS PERFORMED









































SouRcE: For U.S., derived from detailed figures in Railroad Trdnsportation: A
Statisticat Record, 1921.1955, Washington, 1956, p. 26.For Soviet Union, S. K.
Danilov(ed.). Ekonomihatransporta [Economics of Transportation], Moscow, 1956,
p.327;Vestnikstatistiki [BulletinofStatistics], 1959, No. 4, p. 92; Zheleznodorozhnyi
transport [RailroadTransportation],1957, No. 3, p. 31,and 1960,No.3, p.34.
The1960estimate assumes an eight-point drop, following a seven-point drop in
1959 and a six-point drop in 1958.
railroads moved from 90 to 60 per cent steam between 1945 and 1950
while the USSR. moved from 90 to 60 per cent steam between 1954
and 1960.
It will be instructive to compare the behavior of certain operating
statistics during the respective transition periods. This is done in
Table 25 for measures which one would expect to be particularly
affected in a favorable direction by the increasing use of diesel power.
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TABLE 25
COMPARISON OF RAILROAD OPERATING STATISTICS, UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION












































a Gross ton-kilometers per freight train-hour are given by Holland Hunter in
Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies, Joint Economic Committee,
of the United States, Washington, 1959, p. 197; Hearings, November 13-20,
1959, Joint Economic Committee, Washington, 1960, p. 91.
It will be observed that the improvement in these indexes for U.S.
roads was very modest compared with the achievement recorded in
the Soviet Union. U.S. freight traffic measured in ton-miles fell by
23 per cent from 1945 to 1949. On the other hand, Soviet freight
traffic grew by 67 per cent. In the USSR all elements of plant were
being used more intensively and steam power was being augmented
and improved even while diesel power came on the road in increasing
quantities. In the United States the terminal year of the comparison
was marked not only by a poor level of business, but also by strikes
which had far-reaching effects upon the movement of traffic. When all
of these things are allowed for, however, the Soviet performance
appears very good indeed. And even if 1950 U.S. data are used,
carrying a little further into the dieselization movement, the U.S.





















GROSS TON-MILES (oR KILOMETERS) PER TRAIN.HOURa
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It is probable that train loading and movement in the Soviet Union
has also been favorably influenced by significant improvement in the
permanent way and signaling. Very little information has come to
hand on these points. Condition of track is, in any event, difficult
to measure and express. Yet improvement in line and surface permits
both increased speed and train loads. And the improvement in signal-
ing and more abundant provision of auxiliary trackage (passing sidings,
crossovers, etc.) may materially improve the rate of movement over
the road. Some scattered evidence suggests substantial improvement
in track. Thus 72 per cent of all main track is said to have had rail
weighing at least 43.6 kilograms per running meter in com-
pared with 56 per cent in 1954 and 17.2 per cent in 1940.85 By 1957
over 20 per cent of track was laid on crushed stone ballast, while
crushed stone and gravel ballast together accounted for 40 per cent.8°
In 1954 some 37.4 per cent was on stone or gravel compared with 24.4
per cent in 1940.87 Hence a great improvement in the mileage lai4
with heavy rail has been effected along with some improvement in
ballast. Both these developments should have resulted in improved
track condi lions.
84 Khachaturov, Ekonomika transporta,p. 445.
85Danilov, transporta, p. 363.
86 Khachaturov, Ekonomika transporta, p. 445.
87 Danilov, Ekonomika transporta, p. 363..
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